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Abstract
De la Torre, Yeyati,  and Schmukler present a framework  the world financial  markets.  But developing  countries
to analyze financial  globalization.  They argue that  normally  display the "unblessed  trinity"  (weak currency,
financial globalization  needs to take  into account the  fear  of floating,  and weak institutional  framework).
relation  between money  (particularly  in its role as store  The authors define and discuss two alternative  avenues
of value),  asset and factor price flexibility,  and  (a  "dollar trinity" and a "peso trinity")  for developing
contractual  and regulatory  institutions.  Countries that  countries to safely  embrace international  financial
have the  "blessed trinity"  (international currency,  flexible  integration while the blessed  trinity remains beyond
exchange rate  regime, and  sound contractual and  reach.
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Financial globalization, that is, the integration  of countries into international  financial
markets,  is not a new phenomenon.  However,  it is taking new forms  and  posing complex
problems  to emerging economies.  This paper proposes  a new framework  to understand  the
challenges  that  emerging  countries  face  as  they  integrate  with  the  international  financial
system,  as well  as to discuss  the realistic options  open to them  as they  strive  to control  the
risks of financial globalization while capturing its benefits.
Historically,  the  gold  standard  period  (1880-1914)  saw a  major  wave  of financial
globalization,  as cross-border  capital  flows surged,  incorporating countries  in the center and
the periphery  into  a worldwide network of finance  and investment.  With the advent of the
First World War, global  growth halted and international  financial integration  was  disrupted,
with minimal capital movement  between  1914 and  1945.  A slow reconstruction of the world
financial  system took  place during  the Bretton  Woods  era (1945-1971),  although domestic
financial markets remained heavily regulated and controls were  typically imposed on capital
flows.  It was not until the  1970s that the world witnessed  the beginning of a new wave  of
international financial integration,  reflecting  the dismantling of capital controls, de-regulation
in  domestic  financial  systems,  and  revolutionary  technological  innovations  (not  just  in
information  and telecommunications  but also  in  financial  product  engineering).  Emerging
markets joined this new wave of financial  globalization  with vigor starting  in the latter part
of the  1980s.
Obstfeld  and  Taylor  (2002)  argue  that  the  different  historical  phases  of financial
globalization  can  be  understood  in  terms  of the  "impossible  trinity."  According  to  this
proposition a country can consistently pursue only two out of the three policy objectives: free
capital  mobility,  a  fixed  (or  highly  stable)  nominal  exchange  rate,  and  an  autonomous
monetary policy.  Obstfeld  and  Taylor explain  that  international  capital mobility  has,  thus,
prevailed in periods of political  support either for subordinating  monetary policy to exchange
rate stability (as in the gold standard),  or for giving up exchange  rate stability so as to enable
monetary  policy  to  pursue  domestic  objectives  (as  in  the  post-Bretton  Woods  era).  In
contrast,  when  countries  attempted  simultaneously  to target  their  exchange  rates  and  use
monetary policy in pursuit of domestic objectives  (e.g., to combat the slowdown of economic
activity in the interwar period), they had to impose controls to curtail capital movements.
Obstfeld  and  Taylor  characterize  well  the post-Bretton  Woods  process of financial
globalization for developed countries.  But emerging economies have lived a different reality.
While  they have  tried a  wide  range  of exchange  rate arrangements-soft  pegs, hard-pegs,
crawls,  bands, and  flexible  exchange  rate  systems-more  recently,  particularly  since  1995,
the share of emerging  countries  declaring  themselves as having  flexible  exchange  rates  has
been  on the  rise (Larrain  and Velasco  2001).  However,  even  countries that  have opted for
flexible arrangements  in principle  display "fear of floating" in practice'  and are thus unable
to fully profit from an autonomous monetary policy.2 Moreover, emerging markets that have
X See,  for example,  Calvo  and  Reinhart  (2002),  Hausmann  et  al.  (2001),  and Levy  Yeyati  and Sturzenegger
(2001).
See, for example,  Frankel, Schmukler,  and Serven (2002).
1embraced  financial  globalization  have  in  many  cases  been  severely  bruised  by  financial
crises.  Witness  the crises  in Latin  America in the 1980s,  Venezuela  1994, Mexico  1994-95,
East Asia  1997-98,  Russia  1998,  Brazil  1999, Ecuador  2000,  Turkey  2001,  and  Argentina
2001-02.
Although financial  globalization  alone  cannot explain  the  frequency  and severity of
financial  crises,  its  post-Bretton  Woods  incarnation  has  been  associated  with  a  rising
incidence  of twin  (currency  and  banking)  crises,  and  even triple  (currency,  banking,  and
debt) crises  such as the recent ones in Ecuador and Argentina.3 The current wave of financial
globalization has been,  especially for the periphery, punctuated by painful episodes of capital
flow  reversals  or "sudden  stops."  The integration  of the  domestic  financial  systems  from
middle-income  countries  into the world's financial markets has not led to the materialization
of  such  promised  benefits  as  a  truly  counter-cyclical  monetary  policy,  consumption
smoothing,  deepening  and  diversification  of their  domestic  financial  markets,  noticeable
reduction  in  the  cost  of  capital,  and  significant  availability  of  long-duration  financial
contracts  denominated in the  domestic  currency.4 In all, it is hard to  escape  the conclusion
that the post-Bretton Woods  wave of financial globalization  has not worked as advertised for
the periphery.
In this paper we argue that the successes and failures of financial  globalization can be
linked to the nature of interactions  between three elements:  (1) money, particularly in its role
as  store  of value;  (2)  nominal  (asset  and  factor  price)  flexibility;  and  (3)  the  quality  of
contractual  and regulatory  institutions.  We  introduce  the  notion  of the  "blessed  trinity"
(international  currency,  flexible  exchange  rate,  and sound institutions),  as  a benchmark that
defines  conditions  under  which countries  can integrate  successfully into the world financial
markets.  In contrast,  developing  countries  generally  exhibit  what  we call  the "unblessed
trinity" (weak currency, fear of floating, and weak institutions), which sets them up for nasty
experiences  as they integrate into  international  financial  markets.  Inasmuch as it is difficult
for these countries  to reach the blessed trinity, we argue that, realistically,  their option is to
adopt either a "dollar  trinity"  or a "peso  trinity,"  the  achievement  of which  is enough  of a
complex challenge.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 examines the elements of the
blessed trinity and how they interact to empower financial  globalization.  Section 3 analyzes
the  unblessed  trinity and  how  it  handicaps  the  ability  of emerging  countries  to  integrate
successfully  into the international  financial system.  Section 4 'explores the dollar trinity and
the  peso  trinity,  and  the  pitfalls  and  options  on  the  road  to  building  them.  Section  5
concludes.
3See, for example, Kaminsky  and Reinhart (1999).  Also, Bordo et al.  (2001) show,  for instance, that currency
crises  were  more frequent during the  Bretton Woods era (1945-1971),  a period of low financial  globalization,
compared to the gold standard era (1880-1914), a time of high financial  globalization.
4 Obtsfeld (1998), Stulz (1999),  and Mishkin (2001) discuss the benefits of financial globalization.
22.  The Blessed  Trinity
The intemational finance  literature has argued  for a long time that financial markets,
both  domestic and  intemational,  are far from  perfect.'  Finance  is subject to problems  like
incomplete  markets,  asymmetric  information,  noise  trading,  bubbles,  herding,  multiple
equilibria, moral  hazard, and contagion.  Some of these problems  are more prevalent  at the
domestic  level  (like  incomplete  markets),  while  others  are  more  prevalent  when  a country
integrates  with  the  intemational  financial  system  (like  asymmetric  information  and  moral
hazard).6
Despite  these  problems,  a  country  can  integrate  successfully  into  the  imperfect
intemational  financial markets  to the extent that it exhibits  the "blessed trinity,"  defined  as
the  fundamental  (mutually  reinforcing)  setup  of:  (1) international  currency,  (2) flexible
exchange rate, and (3) sound contractual  and regulatory  environment  (Figure 1). To these we
turn next.
Figure 1. The Blessed Trinity
Strong insfitutions
2.1.  Definitions
An international  currency is one that is accepted as a store of value both at home (so
that it is used for domestic  financial intermediation)  and abroad (so that the country  can issue
local-currency  denominated  debt  in  international  markets).  This  intemational  stature  is
underpinned  by  credible  macroeconomic  policies  and,  in particular,  by  a sustainable  fiscal
process that ensures the solvency of the currency issuer.
A  country  has  a  flexible  exchange  rate  if it  allows  its  currency  to  float relatively
freely  against  other  currencies,  without  the  need  to  hold  large  amounts  of reserves  of
international  currency  ("life jackets")  in  an  attempt  to give  credibility  to the  float.'  The
effectiveness  of  the  flexible  exchange  rate  system  is  institutionally  underpinned  by  a
reputable central bank.
5  See, for example, Allen and Gale (2000a and 2000b), De Long et al. (1990),  Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996).
6  See Calvo (2002).
7  See Calvo (2000a).
3A  sound  contractual  and  regulatory  environment  is one  that adequately  minimizes
principal-agent  problems  that  are  inherent  to financial  systems.'  It  does  so  by  ensuring
contract  enforcement  (finance  is  contract-intensive)  and  reducing  its  costs,  and  by
minimizing  information  asymmetries.  Contract  enforcement  is  underpinned  by  clear
shareholder  and  creditor  rights  and reflects  the  operation  of the  rule  of law  backed by  a
trustworthy judiciary.  A  sound  regulatory  environment  reduces  incentives  for undue  risk
taking and looting through, among other things, good accounting  and information disclosure
standards, risk-based capital  requirements,  and private sector monitoring  complemented by a
type of official monitoring  that is both rigorous  and conducted  in a manner that fosters risk
awareness.  It also  features  a  financial  safety  net that carefully  controls risk  shifting to the
government (moral hazard) while limiting contagion risk and fostering financial deepening.
2.2.  The Blessed  Trinity Empowers Globalization
A  country  blessed  with  the  trinity  can  integrate  successfully  into  (imperfect)
international  financial  markets  because  the  components  of the  trinity  interact  in  virtuous
ways to control  the risks of financial globalization while maximizing  its benefits.
Being a credible  store of value  at home, the  local currency becomes the axis around
which  domestic  financial  intermediation  and  contracting  is  effectively  organized.  This,
complemented by sound regulatory  and contractual institutions,  gives rise to deep and liquid
markets  for  long-duration,  domestic-currency  denominated  fmancial  assets  (e.g.,  equity
securities  and  long-term  debt  at  fixed  interest  rates).  As  a result,  currency  and maturity
mismatches  can be minimized,  which is key to reducing  country risk  and its volatility.  In
particular,  households  and firms with incomes  in the non-tradable  sector can easily contract
liabilities denominated in the domestic currency (or, more precisely, denominated in terms of
non-tradables) at a reasonable cost.9
To the extent that the domestic  currency is also  a credible store of value abroad, the
government  and residents  of a trinity-endowed  country  can issue  debt denominated  in the
domestic  currency  in  international  markets.  This  simple  but  remarkable  feat  enables  the
domestic  economy  to  deepen  its  financing  sources  as  they  access  international  capital
markets, without incurring foreign exchange  risk.
The  combination  of  an  international  currency  with  a  flexible  exchange  rate
underscores  two privileged policy capacities.  The first is the central bank's ability to conduct
counter-cyclical  monetary  policy  (i.e.,  to  smooth  out  cyclical  output  and  employment
fluctuations  to  the  extent that monetary  policy  has  transitory  real  effects).  Note that  this
capacity  stems from both elements of the  trinity and not,  as  often  believed,  from exchange
rate flexibility alone.  In a world of highly mobile capital, giving up a policy of exchange rate
stability may not suffice to enable the simultaneous achievement of the two other sides of the
Mundellian  trinity, that is,  complete  financial  openness  and full monetary  policy  autonomy
8 Ultimately,  the soundness of the contractual  and regulatory  environment  is directly  linked  to the quality and
strength of government  and of democratic institutions.
9 The fixed-rate  30-year  domestic-currency  denominated  mortgage  loan  is indeed  a wonderful creature  of the
blessed trinity, and the object of  healthy envy of trinity-challenged countries.
4(including a counter-cyclical  capacity).  In contrast, we argue that an international  currency is
a sufficient condition  to achieve  counter-cyclical  monetary policy in the context of a flexible
exchange  rate.  This  point will  become  clearer  later  on  in this  paper,  as we  discussed  the
features  of the "unblessed trinity."
The  second  is the  ability of the blessed  country  to  rapidly  adjust the real  exchange
rate  (i.e., the relative price  of tradables  to non-tradables)  to a more depreciated  equilibrium
level,  without  unnecessary  output  losses  and without  significant  balance  sheet disruptions.
As  wages  and  goods  prices  are  typically  slow  to  adjust  downwardly,  flexibility  in  the
nominal  exchange  rate permits  a fast  depreciation  of the real  exchange  rate towards  a new
equilibrium,  with the associated  expenditure  switching  effects  sparing  the country from the
unnecessary  pain of having to adjust only through aggregate  expenditure reduction and the
resulting unemployment  and deflation.'"  Expenditure switching  effects also imply that, for a
blessed country  that is temporarily  suffering from  excess  capacity and unemployment,  a real
exchange  rate depreciation will typically lead to an expansion in economic activity.
Moreover,  as  mentioned  earlier,  in a trinity-endowed  country,  households  and firns
whose  income  is  derived  from  the non-tradable  sector  can  easily  borrow  in  the  domestic
currency.  As a result,  a real exchange  rate  adjustment  through a nominal  depreciation  of the
currency  has  favorable  balance  sheet effects  as it reduces  the real value of their outstanding
local-currency  debts.  These  salutary  balance  sheet  (stock)  effects  reinforce  the  above-
mentioned  positive  (flow) effects  of a real exchange  rate depreciation  on economic  activity.
At the  same  time,  tradable-sector  firms  can avoid  currency  mismatches  by  hedging  their
domestic-currency  liabilities  in  well-functioning  spot  and  derivatives  markets  (whose
presence  is  a  consequence  of  the  international  nature  of  the  domestic  currency)  or by
borrowing in the foreign currency (i.e., denominating their debts in terms of tradables)."
Given  the  international  acceptance  of the  domestic  currency,  the  central  bank  can
provide  last resort assistance to its banking sector by borrowing both domestically or abroad,
thus fending off unnecessary  contagious  runs while avoiding the recourse  to the inflationary
tax.  This ultimately validates the type of financial  stability that is a precondition  for the local
currency to be attractive  internationally.
The combination  of a reputable  central bank with  savings  that are  invested in local-
currency  assets curbs  the risk that governments  would succumb  to time inconsistency  (i.e.,
the  incentive  to  inflate  away  its  liabilities  after  it  has  issued  them),  as  the  benefits  of
defaulting  on  their  debts  through  inflation  are  overshadowed  by  short-  and  long-run
economic  and  political  costs  if the  value  of the  savings  of their influential  constituencies
(e.g.,  pension  fund  beneficiaries)  are  eroded  through  surprise  inflation.  The  trinity  thus
protects  savers, who respond by sticking to the local currency as a store of value.
10  As  Friedman (1953)  keenly  noted  in his  classic  defense  of flexible  exchange  rates, adjusting  the nominal
exchange rate  upward is superior to adjusting  nominal wages  and prices  downward  for analogous  reasons  that
the automatic move to daylight savings time  is easier than coordinating  the will of a large  number of people to
begin all habitual activities one hour earlier.
"  Recall  that  the  payments  for  international  trade  and  financial  contracts  are  typically  settled  in hard,
international currencies.
5Few countries in the world (United States, Germany followed by the European Union,
England,  Japan  until recently)  are blessed  with  the trinity  and  can  thus  embrace  financial
globalization  in a relative  safe manner and reap its benefits, in spite  of the highly deficient
international  financial architecture.
3.  The Unblessed  Trinity
At the other extreme,  dramatically  far from  the blessed  trinity, are typically  open (to
trade  and  finance)  and unstable  emerging  economies  that  exhibit  the  "unblessed  trinity,"
defined as the perverse interaction  of: (1) weak currency,  (2) limited exchange rate flexibility
("fear  of floating"),  and (3) weak  contractual  and  regulatory  environment  (Figure  2).  For
unblessed countries,  integrating into international  financial markets  is a perilous affair.
Figure 2.  The Unblessed  Trinity
Weak institutions
3.1.  Definitions
An unblessed emerging  economy  has a weak currency,  that is, a currency  that is not
accepted either internationally or domestically  as a reliable  store of value.  Even after years
of low inflation,  domestic investors  in the unblessed  country shy away from local-currency-
denominated  financial  assets (financial  dollarization).'2 As a result, non-tradables  producers
end  up  with  debts  denominated  in  tradables-a  most  troublesome  version  of "liability
dollarization."  On  the  other  hand,  when  domestic  dollar  intermediation  is  restricted,  a
country  with a weak currency  displays  pronounced  short-termism in financial contracts that
re-price  very frequently  (e.g.,  deposits  with interest  rates  that adjust daily in line with the
overnight  rate).  In sum,  a weak currency  leads  to financial  fragility  since,  as  markets  for
long-duration,  domestic-currency  financial  assets  are  virtually  non-existent,  currency  or
maturity mismatches in the domestic financial system are inevitable.'3
12 On  the pervasiveness  of financial  dollarization  in  emerging economies,  see Baliffo  et al. (1999)  and Ize and
Levy Yeyati  (2001).  Note  that,  without  loss  of generality,  we  use  the dollar to denote  any  internationally
accepted currency.
13 The  coexistence of maturity  and currency  mismatches, perhaps  the main manifestation  of the weak currency
problem,  relates to Eichengreen and Haussman's (1999) "original sin," i.e., the inability to issue long-term debt
in  the  local  currency.  The  origin  of the  weak  currency  problem  relates  to  various  factors,  including  the
existence  of incomplete  markets,  and  the  combination  of weak  institutions  and  moral  hazard  (namely,  the
temptation to reduce fiscal obligations through inflation).
6A  country with  the unblessed  trinity  has  fear of floating.  Even those  declaring  to
have a flexible exchange  rate  systematically  reveal  a preference  for exchange rate  stability,
heavily relying on interest rate policy and foreign  exchange intervention to limit fluctuations
in  the  exchange  rate.  Calvo  and  Reinhart  (2001)  discuss  the  factors  underlying  this
preference.  In  financially  dollarized  economies  where  non-dollar  eamers  are  indebted  in
dollar,  a  discrete  depreciation  may  generate  corporate  and  household  bankruptcies  and,
consequently, bank failures, with serious fiscal consequences.  This is aggravated by the fact
that the central bank's capacity to fulfill the role of lender of last resort without inflationary
costs  is  limited  to  its  capacity  to  be  a  borrower  of  last  resort,  itself  curtailed  by  the
procyclicality  of intemational  capital  markets vis  a vis  weak  currency  countries.'4 On  the
other hand,  depreciations  tend to be avoided  also because of their adverse  impact on inflation
due  to  the  propensity  for  dollar  indexation  in  inflation-prone,  financially  dollarized
economies.  In addition,  as argued  by Calvo and Reinhart  (2002), policy makers may prefer
exchange  rate to  interest  rate  stability  since  by doing  so they provide  the economy  with  a
readily verifiable  (hence, more credible) nominal anchor.'5
The third component of the unblessed  trinity is the presence of weak institutions  that
yield a deficient contractual and regulatory environment.  The unblessed country  rates poorly
in  terms  of rule  of law  and  its judiciary  is  unreliable  and  plagued  by  corruption.  Fiscal,
monetary,  and  regulatory  institutions  are  weak,  reflecting  deeper  weaknesses  in  overall
governance  and  democratic  institutions.  Central banks are subject  to political  maneuvering.
Accounting  and  disclosure  practices  are  sub-standard,  and  shareholder  rights  and  creditor
rights  are  ill  defined  and  poorly  enforced.  As  a  result,  principal-agent  and  information
asymmetry problems  are severe,  fostering  excessive  risk taking  and looting in the  financial
system,  thus  compounding  the  vulnerabilities  that  stem  from  the poor  performance  of its
currency as a store of value.'6
3.2.  The Unblessed  Trinity Handicaps Globalization
The  above  elements  conspire  to  intensify  risks  as  the  unblessed  country  integrates
into international  financial markets.  This is due to a web of vicious interactions and feedback
loops  between  the  elements  of the  unblessed  trinity  that  result  in  fragile  macro-financial
conditions and in a financial system highly vulnerable to shocks and self-fulfilling attacks.
Due  to  fear  of  floating,  international  reserves  in  unblessed  countries  provide  a
"double  guarantee,"  for bank deposits  and for the currency.  This,  as Dooley (2000)  shows,
heightens  the  country's  vulnerability  to  speculative  attacks-that  is,  a  crisis  caused  by  a
devastating run engineered at a time where there are no perceptible  changes in fundamentals,
by agents that, to avoid capital losses, anticipate the inevitable.'"
14  This  feeds  back  on  the weakness  of the  currency,  exacerbating  the  fear  to  float, the  counter-cyclicality  of
monetary policy, and the perceived need for "life jackets."  See Calvo (2000b).
15  Emerging  countries may also want to avoid  large appreciations.  That is,  fear of floating in times of buoyant
capital  inflows  can reflect concerns with  loosing intemational  competitiveness  (Dutch-disease-type  problems).
16 See, for example,  Mishkin (2001)  and Akerlof and Romer (1993).
'7 See also Aghion et al. (2001) and Burnside et al.  (2001).
7Unblessed countries are typically (and increasingly)  affected by financial (deposit and
loan) dollarization,  to some  extent  a by-product of the interaction  of financial globalization
with unblessed trinities.'8 Financial  globalization, by giving access to a large pool of foreign
funds,  only  intensifies  the  dilemma  between  high-cost  short-duration  peso  debts (with  the
associated  interest  rate risk)  and more affordable  dollar debts  (with the associated currency
risk).  In turn, weak institutions  distort the process of risk pricing (for example, by creating
the perception  of implicit  public  guarantees  against  the  event  risk associated  with  a sharp
depreciation  of the  currency),  inducing  a  preference  for  the first  source of funds,  and,  as
stressed by McKinnon and Pill (1997), over-borrowing  in the foreign currency.'9
In this context, a sharp depreciation can not only unleash inflation, but also erode the
solvency  of debtors  in the non-tradable  sector  harming  the banking  system  (and the  fiscal
accounts to the extent of the existing safety nets) in the process, and giving rise to a negative
feedback between real depreciation and insolvency that undermines the stability properties of
the  real  exchange  rate  and  outweighs  any  expansionary  effect  of a  real  depreciation  on
economric activity.20
It  is  precisely  the  adverse  real  impact  of a  nominal  devaluation,  rooted  in  the
weakness  of the  local  currency  that  underlies  the  well-known  procyclicality  of capital
markets  faced  by developing  countries.  Indeed,  as the  capacity  to pay of the country  as a
whole is positively correlated with the exchange  rate, it is compelled to play the "credibility
game" and raise interest  rates during  times of economic recession  to convince investors not
to flee the currency.2'  Access to international capital markets, inasmuch  as they increase the
flows  to  and  from  the  domestic  economy,  only  accentuates  the  procyclical  nature  of
monetary policy in an unblessed country.
In  sum,  the  unblessed  trinity  is  associated  with  a  severe  problem  of  missing
markets-for the country's currency,  for long-term domestic-currency  denominated  finance,
for hedges,  and  for insurance  products,  among others.  As  a result,  financial  globalization
tends  to  magnify  the  deficiencies  in  both  domestic  policies  and  institutions  and  the
international  markets  themselves,  leading  to  a  higher  incidence  of multiple  equilibria
problems, sudden stops, and self-fulfilling runs.
While some emerging countries may be able to eventually achieve the blessed trinity
in the long run, for most of them the blessed trinity appears  to be an impossible dream.  In
the next sections we  argue that developing  countries  are,  however,  not without options,  for
18 Balifio et al. (1999) fnd that, by 1995, foreign-currency  deposits exceeded on average 45 percent of M2 in 18
countries,  and were  on average over 16 percent of M2  in other 34 countries.  Honohan and Shi (2002) find that
deposit dollarization has continued to increase since then in most countries that allow dollar deposits.
19 In  addition, credit and asset  bubbles  exacerbate  information  asymmetry  problems  and plants  the seeds  for
subsequent crises.  See Gavin and Hausmann (1996).
20  Ecuador's  1999  crisis  illustrates  the  dire consequences  of floating  with liability dollarization  and a  weak
fiscal  position.  The  crisis  deepened  dramatically  as  devaluation  and  debtor  insolvency  were  caught  in a
feedback loop, leading the real exchange  rate to spiral away (De la Torre, Garcia-Saltos, and Mascar6 2002).
21 Evidence on this is presented in Hausmann  et al. (2001).
8they can work on either one of two more realistic  solutions: the "dollar trinity" and the "peso
trinity."
4.  Two  Trinities for the Unblessed
Unblessed countries may be tempted  to conclude that they should isolate themselves
from financial  globalization.  But that is certainly  not a desirable  option,  and possibly  also
not a  feasible  one.  A  country  completely  isolated  from  international  capital  and  financial
services  is  likely  to  be  poorer  and  with  poorer  growth  prospects  than  even  unblessed
countries  attempting  to integrate, partly because  the latter would be under constant external
pressure  to improve  their domestic policies  and institutions.  Moreover,  given the speed of
financial  innovation,  it  is  doubtful  that  capital  controls  can  successfully  keep  domestic
residents  locked  away  from  international  financial  markets.  Finally,  it  would  be  self-
defeating to systematically  scare away foreign direct investment and financing.
The problem  for an emerging economy,  thus,  is not whether but how to integrate  into
world  financial  markets.  Part  of  the  answer  has  been  implicitly  given  in  the  previous
sections:  by striving to establish the blessed trinity or at least mimicking its main  features, or
by  taking  actions  whose  effects  compensate  for  the  missing  components.  Depending  on
which of them  is deemed more relevant  two alternatives  appear feasible.  Both focus  on the
exchange rate.
Economists  are  divided  into  advocates  of  flexible  exchange  rate  regimes  and
advocates of hard pegs or outright dollarization.  The discussion below adds to the debate by
squarely  putting  exchange  rate  issues  in the  context  of financial  globalization.  From  that
point  of view,  we  argue  that  there  are  two  viable  trinities  for  the  unblessed:  the  "dollar
trinity"  and the "peso trinity."  Although still  distant from the blessed  trinity,  these  options
constitute  a  major  improvement  over  the  unblessed  trinity  in  facilitating  a  successful
financial  globalization for emerging markets.
The dollar trinity  focuses  on the weak currency  side of triangle.  Its premise  is that,
since the  local  currency  is not to fulfill the role of store of value  in the near future,  formal
(unilateral) dollarization  is adopted as a means to establish an unquestioned  store of value to
foster  on-shore  financial  intermediation.  In  this  context,  the challenge  lies  in recomposing
the  other  two  sides  of the  trinity-i.e.,  gaining  adequate  nominal  flexibility  and  building
sound institutions.
The peso trinity focuses on the fear of floating side of triangle.  Its premise is that fear
can  and should be overcome,  mainly  through  inflation targeting.  The challenge  then shifts
towards recomposing the  other two  sides of the triangle-i.e.,  strengthening institutions  and
establishing  the domestic  currency  as the store of value  to underpin  a sustainable  deepening
of financial markets.
We  set  high  standards  for these  two  unblessed  trinities.  For  instance,  Ecuador  is
formally  dollarized  but  is  far  from  qualifying  for  the  dollar  trinity.  In  contrast,  a  well
functioning  example  of  a  dollar  trinity  in  our  view  would  be  Hong  Kong.  Similarly,
9Argentina is currently formally pesified but very far from meeting the standards for the peso
trinity.  Well-functioning  examples of the peso trinity would be Australia and Chile.22
4.1.  The Peso Trinity
Optimal  currency  area  (OCA)  considerations23 are  crucial  to  identify  unblessed
countries  that should  naturally strive along the path towards the peso trinity.  Thus, the peso
trinity  is a goal  that better  suits a trinity-challenged  country that has a relatively  large non-
tradable sector,  that trades  with  countries  in different  currency  zones,  and  that is subject  to
significant  idiosyncratic  real shocks-i.e.,  shocks that are uncorrelated to those in countries
with which it trades.  The advisability of pursuing the peso trinity would be clearly reinforced
where these OCA conditions  coexist with a low level of financial dollarization.
The above  conditions  would enhance the capacity  of inflation  targeting to boost the
role of the domestic currency  as a store  of value around which  markets  for  longer-duration
financial  contracts  can  be  organized.  Also,  the  greater  variability  of the  exchange  rate
associated with inflation targeting  would reduce  incentives for financial dollarization.2'  As a
result,  inflation  targeting would more  effectively  help  the country absorb  shocks  (including
sudden  stops)  by  facilitating  the  adjustment  of its  real  exchange  rate  to  the  post-shock
equilibria.
But building these virtuous capacities is likely to be much more difficult than militant
partisans  of exchange  rate  flexibility  care  to  accept,  even  if the mentioned  OCA and  low
financial  dollarization  conditions  are  obtained.  A  key reason  was  mentioned  earlier.  The
unblessed  country  might have avoided financial dollarization  mainly because  its government
systematically  fostered,  for  instance,  (i)  the  emergence  of peso  financial  contracts  of
extremely short duration, and (ii) the transfer of currency mismatches from the private sector
to the public  sector.  The  government's  balance  sheet would  thus  concentrate  significant
unhedged currency  and interest  rate risks.  If so, fear  of floating would not be that  easy to
overcome through  inflation  targeting.  More importantly,  the enhancement  of the role of the
domestic currency  as  store of value  to underpin  long-term  peso  finance  would necessarily
call for a significant  fiscal effort.  In effect,  the  government  would need to generate  higher
primary  surpluses  to  afford  the  costs  of changing  the  composition  of its  debt  in  favor  of
longer-term  fixed-interest-rate  peso  obligations,  and  in  order  to  generate  a  reliable  yield
curve for peso interest rates.
Things  get  more  complicated  (but not  completely  hopeless)  if significant  financial
dollarization  is  part  of the  initial  conditions  of the  unblessed  country  pursuing  the  peso
trinity.  Inflation  targeting  would  then  face  much  tighter  constraints  since  financially
dollarized  economies -with an inflation  target  cannot afford wide  exchange  rate  fluctuations
22 Note that these two trinities are related but do not fully overlap with those proposed by the bipolar view (fully
floating or super fixed exchange  rates).  See Fischer (2001) and references therein.
23 See Mundell (1961).
24  Ize and Levy Yeyati (2001) show that financial  dollarization depends  on the volatility of inflation relative to
that of the real exchange rate  (i.e.,  the volatility of real  returns in peso financial  assets relative to those in dollar
assets).
10due  to  their  deleterious  effect  on  inflation.25 And  the  scope  for  generating  substantial
financial  intermediation in the local currency is likely to be modest.  In effect, skepticism on
the feasibility  of a voluntary  reversal of financial dollarization  in emerging markets  appears
justified  given  the  dearth  of real  life  examples  (despite  progress  towards  macroeconomic
stability)  and  the fact  that  financial  dollarization  has been  generally  rising pari passu  with
financial  globalization.26 Nonetheless,  it is  increasingly  recognized  that inflation  targeting
could  still  operate,  albeit  in  a  highly  constrained  manner,  in  a  country  with  significant
financial  dollarization,  as long as real dollarization  (i.e., the indexation of domestic prices  to
a foreign currency) is low and the local currency is used for transactions.2"
The establishment  of the  domestic  currency  as store  of value  entails  a much  more
complex  challenge,  which  could be  realistically  achieved  only after  a long track  record  of
successful inflation  targeting, complemented  along the way by "policy crutches"  (see below)
and by considerable  institutional  strengthening.  Indeed,  for smaller open economies  already
affected  by  high  financial  dollarization  (even  if they  display  low  real  dollarization)  and
mainly  subject  to symmetric  real  shocks,  recomposing  financial  intermediation  around  the
domestic currency appears to be a prospect of little realism.
Note that we  are not saying that moving away  from fear of floating towards greater
exchange rate  flexibility is not a net gain for an unblessed country (it is), but rather that such
a move is not sufficient to achieve the peso trinity.  This consideration points to a potentially
important trade  off,  namely,  that in some  cases policy  efforts  wasted in an ultimately futile
effort  to achieve  the  peso trinity  could be more  efficiently  employed  in  the pursuit  of the
dollar trinity, discussed in the next section.
At any  rate,  where  the  peso trinity  remains  a  feasible  goal,  complementary  "policy
crutches"  are likely to be needed,  as noted by Goldstein's (2002) well-articulated  a proposal
for  "managed  floating  plus."  He  recommends  accompanying  inflation  targeting  with
"aggressive  measures  to  reduce  currency  mismatching."  Such  measures  would  include
prudential  norms  (e.g.,  provisions  and  capital  rules)  designed  to  discourage  banks  from
taking  on  unhedged  exposures  to  currency  risk,  either  directly  in  their  balance  sheets  or
indirectly  through the balance sheets of their unhedged debtors.
25  The  problem  is  more general.  As  Chang  and  Velasco  (2000)  put  it,  "any  scheme  to  control  the  rate  of
inflation at a short horizon must control, to some extent,  the nominal exchange rate."
26  Honohan and Shi (2002) find recent and important reversals  in financial  dollarization  in a handful of Eastern
European  countries,  including  Estonia,  Lithuania,  and  Poland.  How  much of these  reversals  are  transitory
and/or related to prospects  of  joining the European Union is, however, yet to be ascertained.
27  Ize and Parrado  (2002) show that, by reducing  the volatility  of inflation relative  to that of the real exchange
rate,  strict inflation targeting could dampen financial dollarization but could encourage wage/price dollarization.
This is because strict inflation  targeting implies  a monetary policy that is unresponsive  to output and other real
shocks,  whose  volatility  induces  real  dollarization  by  enhancing  the benefits  of indexing  wages  to the  dollar.
Ize and Parrado's analysis  leads to the  conclusion that achieving  reasonable exchange  rate  flexibility  is within
the  reach  of countries  pursuing  the  peso  trinity,  assuming  good  macroeconomic  policies  and  an  inflation
targeting  framework that  is not completely  indifferent to  output and employment  fluctuations.  This would be
possible even where  financial dollarization is high, because financial dollarization would in these cases tend not
to coexist with significant wage dollarization.In addition,  the government  should  systematically  strive (and be  willing to  pay the
associated  cost) to raise  the share of long-duration  peso debts  in their liability portfolio and
encourage  the development  of domestic  bond markets.  Allowing the indexation of financial
contracts (for example, to the CPI) can stimulate long-term savings and financing in the local
currency.28
In sum, the road to the peso trinity is not easy and may not be part of the feasible set
for  some  unblessed  countries.  While  achieving  a  reasonable  degree  of  exchange  rate
flexibility  is an important  step in that direction,  the most difficult challenge,  however,  is to
nurture the peso as  a store of value.  A strong  record of consistent,  credible macroeconomic
policy (including temporary policy crutches) is crucial,  and so is the continuous improvement
in the quality of regulatory  and contractual  environment.  The  light at the end of the tunnel
would be that of a functional peso trinity (Figure 3).
Figure 3.  The Peso Trinity
Sound institutions
4.2.  The Dollar Trinity
Again, OCA-type  considerations  help identify unblessed countries  that are naturally
suited to pursue the dollar trinity.  These are the smaller and highly open countries  (i.e.,  with
relatively  small  non-tradable  sectors), whose trade is mainly  with a country or countries  in
the  same  hard  currency  zone,  and  that  are  subject  mainly  to  symmetric  (rather  than
idiosyncratic) real shocks.  The advisability of pursuing the dollar trinity would be reinforced
if the  country  in question has  a  high  degree of financial  dollarization.  However,  this path
towards  the dollar trinity may also have  to be pursued by emerging  economies  that already
display  inconsistencies  between  their  trade  and  financial  structures.  That  would  be,  for
instance,  the  case  of unblessed  countries  that  were  compelled  to  dollarize  formally  in  the
midst of a crisis, in order to avoid total  financial  disintermediation,  even though their OCA-
type features  make pegging to the dollar highly inconvenient.29
28  As  Ize  and  Levy Yeyati  (2001)  show,  CPI  indexation  of financial  assets,  properly  implemented,  tends  to
dominate dollar indexation,  as witnessed  in the case of Chile, where UF deposits were systematically  preferred
to dollar deposits, preventing financial dollarization.
29 Frankel (1999),  following the dictum that "no  one size fits all," notes that dollarization could be a desirable
alternative  for countries  in  which  the  currency  could  never  be  a  store  of value  due  to  either  a  history  of
hyperinflation,  the absence of strong institutions, or high exposure  to nervous international  investors.
12Taking a step in the direction  of the dollar trinity by formally dollarizing can correct
in a  single move  the problems  created by a weak currency,  thereby automatically  equipping
the  unblessed  country  with  one,  but  only  one,  of the  components  of the blessed  trinity.
Formal  dollarization  can  facilitate  financial  intermediation  and  deepening  and  foster  the
lengthening  of  maturities  in  financial  contracts.  By  dampening  capital  flow  volatility
associated  with  perceived  currency  risk,  dollarization  can  reduce  the  scope  for  multiple
equilibria,  thereby  limiting  the  probability  of  self-fulfilling  attacks,  sudden  stops,  and
financial  crises.30
While formal  dollarization  can sever  the direct  link between  fiscal  solvency  and the
currency  as store of value  (see below), it does not itself eliminate the indirect links between
fiscal viability  and the financial system.  Not only does a bad fiscal policy raise country risk
and adversely affect local debt markets but, to the extent that local banks  hold claims on the
government,  increases  the exposure of the banking  system  to sovereign  default.  Moreover,
dollarization  does not automatically lead to fiscal discipline,  and fiscal indiscipline  can  feed
back adversely  into the dollarization  arrangement itself.  As the Argentine case  illustrates, it
is  virtually  impossible  to  prevent  some  variety  of money  printing  when  the  resources  to
finance  the  fiscal  deficit run  out,  contradicting  the view  of dollarization  as an  irreversible
commitment  mechanism.3'
There are other significant tradeoffs  of dollarization that are typically downplayed by
dollarization  advocates.  First, dollarization  limits the capacity of the central bank to fulfill
the role  of lender of last  resort.  While  a  weak currency  country  can  play  this role  at the
expense  of  inflationary  pressures,  formal  dollarization  eliminates  even  this  source  of
protection  of the  payments  system.  Second,  dollarization  means  giving  up  the  hope  for
counter-cyclical  monetary policy, no matter how distant that possibility might have been  for
a  trinity-challenged  country  (see  sections  above).  Third,  it  imposes  tight  limits  on  the
country's  ability  to  adjust rapidly  the  real  exchange  rate  in the  face  of adverse  shocks  (a
particularly troublesome  aspect for countries that do not meet the OCA  criteria).  As long as
downward  price rigidities  exist,  the  adjustment  would take  place  slowly  overtime  through
unemployment  and deflation,  with  high real  interest rates that would  depress the  economy
even further.32 When a protracted recession and deflation  finally drive home the real value of
income  and wealth  in terms of tradables,  it might  be too late  and the country may  face  the
danger of the same self-fulfilling  attacks it sought to immunize itself against when it adopted
formal  dollarization.  Finally, the reported value of debt would be understated  (capacity  to
pay overstated)  relative to the equilibrium value of non-tradable  income, which would mask
the need for, and delay the implementation  of, timely adjustment in spending.
These pitfalls make it clear that, in addition to the continued implementation  of sound
fiscal policies  and general  institution building,  the pursuit of the dollar trinity needs  especial
30  Ecuador's experience  in 2000 illustrates  that  fornal dollarization  can arrest the erosion in fundamentals  and
put a floor to runaway financial turbulence, even where fiscal  and government  debt problems remain unsolved.
' In  Argentina,  this  took the form of issuance of small-denomination  (provincial  and federal)  bonds  accepted
for tax payments,  which by  the end of the first quarter of 2002  amounted to  45%  of the stock  of currency  in
circulation.  See de la Torre,  Levy Yeyati,  and Schmukler (2002).
32 Krugman (2001)  argues that this has affected both Japan  and Argentina.
13complements  to: (i) deal with dollarization-specific  risks, (ii) maximize  dollarization-specific
benefits,  and (iii) achieve an adequate degree of nominal flexibility.  The importance of these
complements  is greater the less the country meets the OCA-type criteria.
Among  the  measures  to  deal  with  dollarization-specific  risks,  two  are  worth
mentioning.  First, there is the need  to design prudential norms to address the risk of dollar
lending  to  the  non-tradable  sector,  considering  that  dollarization  does  not  immunize  a
country  from the balance  sheet effects  of a real  exchange  rate  depreciation  (Roubini  2001;
Chang  and  Velasco  2000).  As  an  overvalued  real  exchange  rate  understates  the  non-
performance  of loans  to  non-tradable  producers,  prudential  norms  are needed to  anticipate
and  manage  the  materialization  of loan  quality  deterioration  in the  event.of a  shock  that
requires  a real exchange  rate depreciation.  These  norms can take the  form of tougher  loan
classification criteria,  higher  loan-loss  provisioning  rules,  and possibly also  a higher weight
for the  purposes  of measuring  capital  requirements  for  loans  to  the  non-tradable  sector.33
This, however,  eliminates  debt deflation  risks  only  partially,  and  at the  expense  of higher
borrowing costs for non-tradables producers.
Second,  there  is the  need  to adequately  protect  the payment  system in  a dollarized
economy, given the lack of a lender of last resort.  As the Argentine crisis illustrates,  general
liquidity  requirements  (i.e.,  available  to  any  and  all  deposits,  on  a  first come  first  served
basis), even if high, may not adequately  protect  the payments  system from a  run. 4 It thus
would appear that, under dollarization,  such protection might require some form of a narrow-
banking  structure  where  there  is  full  liquidity backing  for  transaction  balances  (demand
deposits).  Liquidity would  be  earmarked  to  these  balances  and thus  able  to preserve  the
functioning  of the  payment  system  (and  avoid  deposit  freezes  and  interruptions  of the
payment system), even in the extreme scenario where banks are unable to honor withdrawals
of time  deposits.  Such  a  structure  is  not without  costs,  as  it entails  the  need for  a strict
separation  between  payments  and  investment  institutions.  Moreover,  it  does not eliminate
financial  vulnerabilities  associated  with  the  latter,  what  will  certainly  hamper  the
development of a credit market.  In the end, the  tradeoff between  deepening  those markets
and limiting financial fragility may be unavoidable in the short-run.
One  dollarization-specific  benefit  is  that,  in  principle,  formal  dollarization  protects
banking  intermediation  from  the  vagaries  of  the  fiscal  process,  including  an  event  of
government  debt  default,  as  long  as  banks  are  not  significantly  exposed  to  domestic
government  risk.  The  reason  is  that  the  function of the  dollar  as  store  of value  does  not
depend  directly  on  the  solvency  of  the  domestic  government.35  This  feature  should  be
harnessed  through prudential  norms,  for example  by  assigning  a  positive weight  to banks'
33  The  provisioning  system  could  be  designed  with  counter-cyclical  features.  That  is,  counter-cyclical
provisions  could  be  built  during  buoyant  spending  and  credit  times,  accompanied  by  an  appreciating  real
exchange  rate,  and  then  allowed  to  be  converted  into  specific  provisions  in  times  of real  exchange  rate
depreciation.
34  To be sure, high liquidity requirements  do enhance the resiliency of a banking system-they cushion it vis-a-
vis liquidity  shocks and deter runs, reducing the scope for multiple equilibria.
35 Panama illustrates a case where  a prolonged default in government  debt did not affect the functioning of the
banking system.
14exposure  to  the  government  for  the  purposes  of calculating  capital  requirements,  or  by
introducing limits to such exposure.
Finally,  there  is a need to build adequate  nominal  flexibility  along the path towards
establishing  the dollar trinity  for two main reasons.  First, to  facilitate  the adjustment  in the
real exchange  rate  towards  a  more depreciated  equilibrium  level.  Second,  to  facilitate  the
adjustment of fiscal  spending to income  so as to ensure  debt sustainability.  Undoubtedly,
reforms  that enhance labor.market  flexibility and strengthen  fiscal institutions  are central to
this  endeavor.  However,  the  realities  of political  democracy  may  severely  constrain  the
margin  to reduce  nominal  fiscal expenditure,  especially  in the context  of a  recession.  The
same can be said regarding nominal wage reductions.
It is  therefore  important  to recognize  that,  under  circumstances  of extreme  stress,
political  limitations  on  nominal  flexibility  can  confront  a  dollarized  country  with  major
pressures  to "exit" dollarization.  This raises a most relevant question for countries  pursuing
the dollar trinity, namely, whether an "exit" towards greater flexibility could be engineered in
a way that  does not obliterate  financial  intermediation.  We  consider this issue  at large  in
another  paper  and  conclude  that  dollarization  is  not  inherently  incompatible  with
"pesification at the margin."36
Pesification  at the margin is defined  as a process  of partial de-dollarization  achieved
via  the  introduction  of a new  domestic  currency  for transaction  purposes  (while the  dollar
remains  as  the  main  currency  for  financial  contracting)."  This  could  be  done  either  by
design  or  by  an  orderly  consolidation  of quasi-monies  (such  as  the  Argentine  Lecop  or
patac6n) that may emerge  under severe budgetary  financing constraints.  The success of this
process  would  of course  require  fiscal  consolidation  and  the  reconstitution  of a  credible
central banking capacity  for inflation  targeting.  But if successful,  pesification  at the margin
would  represent  a  major  step  forward  towards  establishing  the  dollar  trinity;  it  would
enhance  nominal  flexibility  without  undermining  the  gains  in financial  intermediation  that
might have been achieved  on account of the use of the dollar as store of value, leaving open
the  option  to  develop  an  autonomous  monetary  policy  under  appropriate  policies  and
upgraded  institutions.  In addition, the new domestic currency could eventually be adopted as
a store of value to  organize  financial  intermediation  for the  non-tradable  sector, addressing
the debt deflation risk mentioned earlier.
The need to build adequate flexibility  is perhaps the main challenge in the road to the
dollar  trinity,  particularly  in  the  case  of larger  dollarized  countries  that do  not  meet OCA
criteria.  As long  as political  limitations  to downward  nominal  flexibility  in fiscal  spending
36  See De la Torre, Levy Yeyati, and Schmukler (2002).
37  The  logic of pesification at the  margin is grounded theoretically  and  empirically  in the distinction between
money as a means of payment and money as a store of value.  Indeed,  the money used for payments transactions
needs not be the same as the money used for savings  and to organize  financial  intermediation.  Ize and Parrado
(2002)  establish  theoretical  conditions  under which  financial  dollarization  can coexist  with  low  or zero  real
dollarization.  Empirically,  this  distinction is  commonly  observed-Bolivia,  Costa Rica,  Guatemala,  Perui,  and
Uruguay  are among the countries  in Latin America where the domestic  currency is  used for transactions  while
the dollar is  the currency of denomination for most financial contracts.
15and wages  cannot be ignored, we argue that pesification  at the margin  should be regarded as
a key ingredient of the trinity (Figure 4).
Figure 4.  The Dollar Trinity
Sound institutions
5.  Closing Remarks
The  blessed  trinity  may be  unreachable  for many  emerging  markets  but there  are
some  blessings  for the unblessed,  as  long  as they  undertake  bold  and  consistent reforms.
Countries cannot  go wrong by strengthening  their domestic  institutions.  But they would be
better off by adopting either the dollar trinity or the peso trinity up front and undertaking  the
necessary  institutional  reforms  that  complements  them.  Intermediate  solutions  (e.g.,  soft
pegs), or the pursuit of only one side of the trinity (e.g.,  outright dollarization  or the floating
of a  weak currency,  without  much else),  are likely  to detract  from the benefits of financial
globalization, if not turn them negative.
The  international  financial  community  has  an  important  role  to  play  in  enabling
emerging  countries  achieve  successful  financial  globalization.  Intemational  financial
organizations  can help not only by speeding up the pace of reforms within emerging markets
but also by pressing for improvements in the international financial architecture.  Developing
countries,  as they globalize, have fewer policy instruments,  and need to coordinate with other
countries  to maximize  the benefits  of globalization  while  limiting  financial  vulnerability.
Improving  the  international  financial  architecture  would  thus  disproportionately  benefit
trinity-challenged  emerging economies.  Unfortunately,  trinity-endowed  industrial countries,
which  have  economic  and  geopolitical  power  to  address  the  flaws  in  the  international
financial architecture,  have little incentive to do so if not threatened by financial contagion.38
At the same time, the recent disappointing experiences  of emerging economies may induce a
backlash  in the  process  of financial  integration.  In  the  end,  this  incentive  problem  shifts
responsibility to multilateral agencies.  The question is whether they are up to the challenge.
3 For example,  developed countries  have few  incentives  to transfer resources  to a  truly international  lender of
last resort if they believe that emerging countries are going to be the only ones using such lending facility.
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